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Abstract—Network threats often come from multiple sources 
and affect a variety of domains. Collaborative sharing and 
analysis of Cyber Threat Information (CTI) can greatly improve 
the prediction and prevention of cyber-attacks. However, CTI 
data containing sensitive and confidential information can cause 
privacy exposure and disclose security risks, which will deter 
organisations from sharing their CTI data. To address these 
concerns, the consortium of the EU H2020 project entitled 
Collaborative and Confidential Information Sharing and 
Analysis for Cyber Protection (C3ISP) has designed and 
implemented a framework (i.e. C3ISP Framework) as a service 
for cyber threat management. This paper focuses on the design 
and development of an API Gateway, which provides a bridge 
between end-users and their data sources, and the C3ISP 
Framework. It facilitates end-users to retrieve their CTI data, 
regulate data sharing agreements in order to sanitise the data, 
share the data with privacy-preserving means, and invoke 
collaborative analysis for attack prediction and prevention. In 
this paper, we report on the implementation of the API Gateway 
and experiments performed. The results of these experiments 
show the efficiency of our gateway design, and the benefits for the 
end-users who use it to access the C3ISP Framework.  
Keywords—Cyber Threat Information; Privacy Preserving; 
Data Sharing; Collaborative Analysis; API Gateway 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Computer networks confront increasingly crafty and 
complex security threats that are hard to detect and prevent. In 
particular, complex large-scale cyber-security threats often 
affect multiple network domains. For example, the most recent 
large-scale security incident, WannaCry ransomware attack [1], 
has affected more than 150 countries and caused financial 
losses at a tremendous level. To mitigate these threats, cyber 
organisations like Internet Service Providers (ISP) and Cloud 
Service Providers (CSP), make use of a number of typical 
security surveillance and protection tools, like firewalls, 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention 
Systems (IPS). The logs and reports from these security tools 
are used to generate Cyber Threat Information (CTI). CTI is 
any information that can help an organisation identify, assess, 
monitor, and respond to cyber threats [2]. It includes indicators 
of compromise; tactics, techniques, and procedures used by 
threat actors; suggested actions to detect, contain, or prevent 
attacks; and the findings from the analyses of incidents. 
Organisations that share CTI can improve their own security 
profile as well as those of other organisations. 
However, the foremost challenge of CTI sharing is 
establishing trust and safeguarding sensitive information 
among the sharing parties [2]. CTI data often contains sensitive 
and confidential information, therefore, sharing of plain text 
data might cause privacy exposure, and disclose unknown 
security holes if the CTI is shared with untrusted or 
unscrupulous partners. These risks deter and discourage 
organisations from sharing their CTI data. For example, if an 
organisation is willing to share its CTI data with other 
organisations in order to better identify remote attacking 
systems, this also introduces the unintended side-effect of its 
own vulnerable systems being identified to its collaborating 
partner organisations.  
Hence, before sharing the CTI, it must be sanitised by some 
privacy-preserving means, such as pseudonymisation, 
anonymisation, homomorphic encryption, etc. Although these 
approaches will increase the privacy level, they will also 
accordingly decrease the data utility, i.e., adversely affect the 
accuracy of the data analysis. Therefore, a vitally important 
point for privacy-preserving CTI data sharing is to reach a 
trade-off between the data utility and data privacy. The C3ISP 
Project [3] was established to address this very issue, by 
defining a collaborative and confidential information sharing, 
analysis and protection framework as a service for cyber threat 
management. The strategy of the C3ISP Framework uses the 
trust level of the CTI-sharing infrastructure to determine the 
appropriate privacy method. For example, if the infrastructure 
is fully trusted, CTI may be shared in plaintext; if the 
infrastructure is semi-trusted, the data may be pseudonymised 
or anonymised; and if the infrastructure is not trusted, 
homomorphic encryption may be selected, despite its high 
processing overhead.  
The API Gateway, presented in this paper, provides a 
bridge between end-users and their data sources, and the C3ISP 
Framework. The target of the API Gateway is the end-user, and 
the objective is to facilitate how the user retrieves, shares and 
analyses CTI. In this work, we call this kind of end-user 
Prosumer (i.e. producer and consumer). So, the API Gateway 
provides an easy way to allow the user to retrieve CTI data, 
regulate data sharing agreements (DSAs) for data protection, 
share the data using privacy-preserving methods, and invoke 
collaborative analysis for attack prediction and prevention.  
This paper proposes a novel API Gateway architecture 
based on our prior work. In [4], the authors presented an 
architecture for privacy-preserving sharing of CTI with third 
party analysis services. Indeed, that is the prior version of our 
gateway architecture, and it was only used for the Small-
Medium Enterprise (SME) pilot1 to interact with the C3ISP 
Framework. Later, another paper [5] presents a design of two 
functional components, i.e. Data Manager (DM) and 
Collaborative Task Manager (CTM) for the large-scale 
Enterprise (ENT) pilot of C3ISP Framework.  The two original 
designs of the gateway addressed the specific needs of two 
pilots. This paper presents a novel API Gateway architecture, 
which is more modular, domain-agnostic and flexible while 
addressing the needs of both application domains. Hence, 
though it is implemented against the C3ISP Framework, but it 
is not dependent on it. The contribution of this paper can be 
summarized as follows: 
 An effective means of privacy-preserving sharing and 
analysing CTI in the cloud.  
 A flexible architecture of an API Gateway, which can 
be easily tailored to various application domains.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section II will briefly describe the C3ISP Framework and in 
particular, propose the C3ISP Gateway architecture; Section III 
will show a prototype implementation and deployment for 
validating the design; Section IV will conduct some tests and 
show the experimental results; Section V will present the 
literature review; finally, Section VI will derive conclusions 
and suggest some future work. 
II. DESIGN OF THE API GATEWAY 
In this section, we first describe the high level design of the 
SME pilot of the C3ISP Project [3]. Thereafter, we propose a 
flexible architecture of API Gateway (termed C3ISP Gateway 
in this paper), which has been subsequently implemented for 
both the SME and Enterprise pilots.  Finally, we present the 
hybrid deployment mode used in the SME pilot to clearly 
delineate trust relationships related to CTI data sharing.  
A. SME Pilot Overview 
C3ISP aims to implement privacy-preserving CTI data 
sharing by providing a set of flexible mechanisms, regulated by 
data sharing agreements, which allow owners to retain control 
of what is shared and to protect the information in the most 
appropriate way depending on the usage scenario. The main 
innovation of C3ISP is the possibility to share information in a 
flexible and controllable manner inside a collaborative multi-
domain environment to improve detection of cyber threats and 
response capabilities, while still preserving the confidentiality 
of the shared information. The C3ISP Project consists of four 
pilots, CERT pilot, ISP pilot, ENT pilot and SME pilot.  Each 
                                                          
1 Note that in the context of this paper, the term “pilot” refers 
to the specific application domain, e.g., SMEs or Enterprises. 
pilot makes use of a set of pilot-specific components that 
interact with the components of the C3ISP Framework. This 
work concentrates on the SME pilot. Fig. 1 shows the high 
level design of the SME pilot. We make use of the 
Fundamental Modeling Concepts (FMC) [6] notation to 
construct the block diagrams. 
 
Fig. 1. High Level Design of the SME Pilot: the symbol R   indicates the 
direction of request, which results in a response in the opposite direction 
C3ISP Framework enables SMEs to share CTI, collected by 
different C3ISP partners and stakeholders, for running 
collaborative analytics. The C3ISP Gateway retrieves CTI data 
from the SME’s Managed Security Service (MSS) and uploads 
it to the C3ISP Framework for sharing and analysis. Through 
an easy to use web interface (Portal), the SME user is able to 
manage all of their C3ISP related tasks, i.e., choosing which 
CTI data to share, creating and selecting Data Sharing 
Agreements (DSA), and running collaborative analytics. 
The C3ISP Framework comprises several subsystems (that 
are not shown in Fig. 1, because from the pilot perspective, 
users only invoke the API and web interface of these 
subsystems, whose inner working and design details are 
transparent to the user). These subsystems are: 
1) Data Sharing Agreement (DSA) Manager 
It allows users to define the policies that regulate the CTI 
data sharing, including defining rules of access and usage 
control on shared data, on analytic services and results and 
rules to handle data manipulation operations. 
2) Information Sharing Infrastructure (ISI) 
It allows users to exchange CTI data under the constraints 
specified in the DSA policies and acts as a storage of CTI data 
for controlled access by analytics services. The ISI API is used 
to manage the external communication with the others C3ISP 
subsystems. Note: a local ISI can be used to offload the data 
processing from the centralized infrastructure.  
3) Information Analysis Infrastructure (IAI) 
It allows users to request the execution of analytics services 
on the data protected and shared by the ISI. It supports both 
C3ISP-aware analytics services, jobs that can exploit the full 
capabilities of the C3ISP Framework, and legacy analytics 
service (i.e. pre-existing analytics incorporated into the 
framework), that can run on the shared data but have 
limitations with respect to data protection. The IAI API 
provides an interface for external interaction with the users (or 
their applications) and other C3ISP subsystems. 
4) Common Security Services (CSS)  
The CSS consists of Identity Manager (IM), Key and 
Encryption Manager (KEM), and Secure Audit Manager 
(SAM), which are available to all the subsystems and their 
components in order to satisfy security requirements. 
B. C3ISP Gateway Architecture 
As aforementioned, C3ISP Gateway is an interface between 
the SME environment and the centralised C3ISP Framework. 
Essentially, it complies with the API Gateway pattern of the 
Micro-services Architecture paradigm2. The C3ISP Gateway 
can be attached to various C3ISP Framework-like micro-
services for data retrieving, sharing and analysis, which have 
very clear API identified. The C3ISP Gateway is the entry 
point for all Prosumers. It handles requests in one of two ways: 
some requests are simply proxied/routed to the appropriate 
service; other requests are fanned out to multiple services. 
To allow for adaptable as well as domain-agnostic design, 
the C3ISP Gateway has a flexible architecture that can 
accommodate a variety of CTI data sources and various APIs 
that are fundamental for sharing and analysis of CTI data. As a 
concrete example, this design has allowed shared development 
of core components between the Enterprise and SME pilots, 
and also allows easy adaptation for use with other pilots/CTI 
data sources in the future. Fig. 2 using FMC notation [6] shows 
the detailed component architecture of the C3ISP Gateway. 
Note that it is not limited to this application domain, but can be 
tailored and configured to adapt to other ones. The following 
discussion will present the details of the components.  
 
Fig. 2. C3ISP Gateway Architecture: the green components are fixed across 
all pilots, while and the blue need to be modified according to specific 
application domain. 
1) SME MSS 
The Managed Security Service (MSS) is a third-party security 
service, which enables its customers (the SMEs) to assess the 
security threats and vulnerabilities of data and applications they 
run in physical or virtual machines hosted on many different 
kinds of computing infrastructures or platforms. It stores CTI 
data in the form of event logs, which can be viewed in a web-
based user interface, or retrieved by an API for further 
processing. In the case of the SME Pilot, the MSS plays the 
                                                          
2 https://microservices.io/patterns/apigateway.html 
role of data source. The ENT Pilot, in turn, uses a Data Lake as 
its data source. 
2) MSS Client 
The MSS Client provides access to CTI data collected by 
the MSS.  It handles authentication with the MSS, translates 
client queries from those provided through the REST API into 
MSS-specific input, and uses them to retrieve CTI data from 
the MSS. It then packages the CTI data into a CSV-based 
format understood by the C3ISP Gateway, and generates a 
subset of CTI metadata based on the retrieval criteria and data 
characteristics. The self-contained nature of this module allows 
it to be exchanged for another Data Source client (for example, 
one accessing a Data Lake or database instead of the MSS), 
without any other changes to the C3ISP Gateway. In the case 
of ENT Pilot, the Data Lake client uses a different query 
language and data retrieval protocol to import CTI data. The 
current implementation of the SME MSS client supports 
collection of two CTI event types: Firewall and Anti-malware 
events. 
3) REST API 
The REST API provides a programmable remote interface. 
It is used by the Portal to interact with the C3ISP Gateway. The 
REST API methods and their signatures are consistent across 
the pilots sharing the C3ISP Gateway codebase (i.e., the SME 
and ENT Pilots at the present time). 
4) Portal 
The Portal is a graphical interface that allows the SME user 
to interact with the C3ISP Framework via the C3ISP Gateway.  
It communicates with the C3ISP Gateway using the Gateway’s 
REST API. Through the Portal, the SME user is able to import 
MSS data according to selection criteria, select DSAs to 
associate with CTI data, trigger analytics, and access analytics 
results. Additionally, the Portal provides the SME users with 
links to external tools such as the MSS Manager Web portal 
and the C3ISP DSA Editor.  
Arguably, a unified API Gateway that provides a common 
user-friendly interface to all pilots will be more efficient than  
one consisting of two applications (the Portal and the Gateway) 
connected by a REST API. However, the current C3ISP 
Gateway is required by not only SME pilot but also ENT pilot, 
with other pilots possibly requiring its use in the future. Each 
pilot has its own custom Portal and only needs the Gateway's 
inner working components for accomplishing its tasks. 
Therefore, the current design provides flexibility and 
modularity to the Gateway, which by exposing the REST API 
makes it compatible for different Portal applications belonging 
to different pilots.  
5) Proxies 
The C3ISP Gateway comprises three separate proxies for 
interacting with C3ISP Framework: the DSA Proxy manages 
RESTful interactions of the C3ISP Gateway with the DSA 
Store API on the C3ISP Framework. It retrieves the URI for 
the DSA Store from a configuration file; the ISI Proxy 
manages RESTful interactions of the C3ISP Gateway with the 
ISI API on both the Local ISI and the central ISI. It retrieves 
the URIs for both ISIs from a configuration file; the IAI Proxy 
manages RESTful interactions of the C3ISP Gateway with the 
IAI API on the C3ISP Framework. It retrieves the URI for the 
IAI from a configuration file. 
6) Controllers 
Correspondingly, the C3ISP Gateway includes three separate 
controllers: the Agreement Controller manages functionality 
related to the Data Sharing Agreements via the ISI Proxy (for 
DSA search) and DSA Proxy (for CRUD operations); the Data 
Controller manages the retrieval, packaging and sharing of CTI 
data. It retrieves CTI data from the MSS, sanitises it via the 
Local ISI, and imports it into the C3ISP Framework using the 
ISI Proxy; the Analytics Controller manages requests for 
analytics on the central C3ISP Framework via the IAI Proxy. 
7) Orchestrator 
The Orchestrator stores and executes workflows performed 
by the C3ISP Gateway. Those workflows are then exposed by 
the C3ISP Gateway REST API. The design also allows for the 
Orchestrator to handle scheduling of workflows. 
8) Configuration Store 
The Configuration Store stores stateful information about the 
C3ISP Gateway. Within the SME pilot’s scope, the 
Configuration Store keeps track of default DSAs assigned to 
each type of CTI event. Configuration Store will additionally 
store Orchestrator’s scheduling information. 
9) Security Client 
The Security Client handles user authentication and identity 
management by interacting with the C3ISP Framework CSS 
component. 
III. IMPLEMENTATION AND DEPLOYMENT 
The C3ISP Gateway has been implemented using the 
micro-services paradigm based on the Spring Boot framework 
[7]. It exposes a REST API [8] as its entry point, and also 
communicates with C3ISP Framework components using 
REST. It communicates with the MSS using a SOAP API [9].  
Further, a graphical web interface – the Portal – has been 
developed that communicates with the C3ISP Gateway through 
REST as well. 
The SME Pilot applies the hybrid deployment model of the 
C3ISP Framework, which means that the ISI is deployed both 
locally and centrally. The Local ISI is deployed within the 
SME’s and C3ISP Gateway’s trust domain, and applies the 
DSA to CTI data before uploading it to the centralised ISI. This 
deployment model ensures that unprotected, sensitive or 
unauthorised CTI data never leaves the SME’s trust domain.  
For the SME Pilot, the gateway fulfils the role of a 
Prosumer.  Hence, the local trust domain hosts a Local ISI, 
which sanitises the CTI data according to the DSA before 
sharing it with the central C3ISP Framework. The Local ISI is 
used solely for processing data rather than as local CTI storage. 
The central C3ISP Framework collects and aggregates CTI 
from different sources and performs different sorts of threat 
and vulnerability analytics on the combined data to produce 
useful results and reports. The centralised ISI and IAI 
subsystems are deployed in the central C3ISP infrastructure, 
which lie outside the trust domain of the SMEs. 
The prototype of SME pilot has been deployed in a 
distributed cloud environment, with some components 
deployed in the shared and central C3ISP infrastructure and 
others in the individual SME’s premises. TABLE I. shows the 
shared C3ISP Framework components that have been deployed. 
They were deployed in the testbed that comprised 22 micro-
services distributed among them. 
TABLE I.  SHARED COMPONENTS 
Component CPU RAM DISK Hosted by 
MSS 4 Core AMD Opteron 
@ 2.30 GHz 
16 GB 500 GB BT 
ISI (Central) 4 Core Intel Xeon  
@ 2.30GHz 
12 GB 100 GB CNR 
IAI 8 Core Intel Xeon 
@ 2.30GHz 
16 GB 400 GB CNR 
DSA Manager 2 Core AMD Opteron 
@ 2,493GHz 
4 GB 40 GB CNR 
SAM  1 Core AMD Opteron 
@ 2,493GHz 
2 GB 22 GB CNR 
KEM 8 Core Intel Xeon  
@ 2.30GHz 
16 GB 100 GB CNR 
IM 1 Core AMD Opteron 
@ 2,493GHz 
2 GB 22 GB CNR 
 
  The MSS Clients are deployed in the individual SME’s 
virtual machines (VMs). TABLE II. lists the testbeds used by 
different SMEs for hosting the clients in order to capture data. 
Due to the attack-accessible network environment provided by 
the SMEs, we were able to gather real attacking data. 
TABLE II.  ORGANISATIONS’ TESTBEDS 
Oranization OS information Host Information 
CHINO Amazon Linux 2x VMs hosted by AWS  
GPS Ubuntu 16.04 2x VMs hosted by OVH 
3DRepo CentOS Linux 7 5 x VMs hosted by Google Cloud 
  
In order to complete the CTI data sharing workflow, we 
also defined and created an applicable DSA, which includes 
two authorization policies as follows:  
IF a Subject hasOrganisation a Organisation(UNIKENT) AND 
that Subject isMemberOf a Group(SecurityAnalyst) THEN that 
Subject CAN Read a Data 
IF a Subject hasOrganisation a Organisation(UNIKENT) AND 
that Subject isMemberOf a Group(SecurityAnalyst) THEN that 
Subject CAN invokeMaliciousHostsAnalysis a Data 
One policy identifies which user can read the data if the 
user belongs to an authorized group. The other one specifies 
who can invoke analytics service to analyse the data if the user 
belongs to an authorized group. The experimental results 
regarding the CTI data sharing and analysis workflows will be 
shown in the next section. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION 
The SME pilot is used to validate the operation of the 
C3ISP Framework through the C3ISP Gateway. We used 
primarily a combination of simulated attack data and passive 
test environment data for experiments. The simulated attack 
data included Firewall and Anti-Malware events triggered by 
the tester through attack simulation scripts. Passive test 
environment data included CTI events encountered during 
normal operations by an SME host. We also defined a 
comprehensive set of functional and non-functional acceptance 
tests (ATs), based on their requirements for the confidential 
sharing and analysis of CTI data. Out of 22 originally defined 
acceptance tests, 10 Passed, 6 Partially Passed, and 6 were not 
applicable (N/A). In general, the tests that related to the basic 
sharing of data and to MSS Server management tended to pass 
successfully. While the C3ISP Framework is still under 
development, and its full suite of analytics/data protection tools 
was not available at the time of testing, we were merely able to 
validate our fully-functional SME pilot components against the 
basic end-to-end functionality of the framework prototype. 
For evaluation of collaborative analysis capability of the 
C3ISP Framework, we developed a basic analytics service for 
the SME pilot, termed findAttackingHosts. It analyses all the 
shared firewall CTI data, in accordance to the applied DSA, 
and lists the IP addresses of attacking hosts. In this case, the 
data was composed of three sets of CTI (collected on March 
5th, 2019) from 3DRepo, CHINO and GPS, and a combined set 
(that contains all the former three individual data sets). We ran 
the analysis over each organisation’s own data separately, and 
then ran the analysis over the collaboratively shared data as 
well. Some statistic information of these data sets is shown in 
TABLE III.  













6811 2788 2868 12467 
Amount of  
attacking hosts 
938 1796 783 3135 
 
In each data set, one entry represents one connection 
attempt. Hence, 3DRepo’s data set contains the most 
connection attempts among the three data sets. Also, we 
observed that a large number of hosts only launched one 
connection attempt, while some have issued multiple attacks. 
CHINO’s data set discloses the largest number of attacking 
hosts. Further, we found that some attacking hosts had 
attempted to access more than one SME, so their connection 
attempts were logged by multiple organisations. That is why 
the amount of attacking hosts disclosed by the collaborative 
data set is less than the sum of the individual amount.  
Owing to the SMEs running their VMs as honeypots [10], 
any connection attempt to them is suspicious. Honeypots are 
often used to investigate new attacks by filtering repeated and 
uninteresting connections [11]. We did find that the 
collaborative analysis results reveal more new attacks than the 
individual analysis results. TABLE IV. shows two examples, 
both new attacking hosts can be revealed by the collaborative 
data set, while the first one was missed by CHINO and GPS, 
and the second one was missed by 3DRepo and CHINO. 
TABLE IV.  COMPARISON OF DETECTING NEW ATTACKS 








190.254.122.125 1 0 0 1 
105.247.141.227 0 0 1 1 
Another case in point is to detect suspicious scanners, 
which means an attacking host attempts to connect multiple 
destinations within a time interval [12]. This is hard to conduct 
by only using an individual data set since it only contains one 
destination. However, by conducting collaboratively analysis, 
it is effective to unveil the suspicious scanners. TABLE V. lists 
several ones. All of the listed hosts are very suspicious since 
they had tried to access different organizations multiple times 
within one day.  
TABLE V.  DETECTING SCANNERS BY USING COLLABORATIVE ANALYSIS 








185.176.27.106 48 11 38 97 
185.176.27.6 36 7 34 77 
185.176.27.246 36 5 33 74 
185.176.27.2 36 2 34 72 
  
The other benefit is that one SME that has already been 
attacked can prevent the same attack from occurring on other 
SMEs, by notifying them in advance. TABLE VI. shows one 
instance, where an attacking host launched thousands 
connection attempts against 3DRepo, which might be a DoS 
flooding like attack. The other SMEs can blacklist this 
malicious IP in advance in order to prevent the same attack. 
TABLE VI.  PREVENTING THE SAME ATTACK IN ADVANCE 








169.254.169.254 4187 0 0 4187 
 
Therefore, through performing the C3ISP analysis service 
over collaboratively shared data, novel malicious hosts can be 
revealed and the results are mutually beneficial for all the 
SMEs. In addition, Fig. 3 shows the performance of running 
the analysis over different data sets for reference. The 
collaborative analysis has the greatest time cost since it runs 
over the largest data set.  
 
Fig. 3. Performance of CTI data analysis 
Furthermore, the main aim of this effort was to provide the 
SME users with an easy-to-use solution for accessing the 
services of the C3ISP Framework. During the course of this 
experiment’s workflow, the SME users were able to utilise the 
various micro-services of the C3ISP Framework in the 
following order: 1. DSA search and selection; 2. CTI retrieval; 
3. CTI processing; 4. CTI sharing; 5. CTI analysis and results. 
As all of these micro-services were exposed to the SME 
users through the C3ISP Gateway, which was deployed inside 
their respective trusted domains. A non-functional benefit of 
this approach is its easier adoption by the SMEs, which might 
otherwise be reluctant to participate in a collaborative data 
sharing environment. 
V. RELATED WORK 
A. Privacy-preserving Data Sharing in Cloud. 
Data protection/security is a typical issue in cloud 
computing. Sharing data in the cloud may involve leakage of 
private and sensitive data [13], which should avoid being 
shared with other untrusted partners. If compromised, the data 
could be used by the adversary to launch attacks and create 
unexpected risk. Hence, in order to get a trade-off between the 
data utility and privacy, the privacy-preserving data publishing 
approach [14] for data sharing is a vitally important point. 
Plenty of research effort [15] has been undertaken in the area of 
preserving privacy. Recently, it has also become an important 
research aspect in the area of Big Data processing [16]. 
Generally speaking, privacy-preserving aims at extracting 
relevant knowledge from large amounts of data while at the 
same time preventing exposure of sensitive information. 
Research in this field has devoted much effort to determine a 
balance between the right to privacy and the need for 
knowledge discovery.  
In practice, different security requirements and metrics can 
often lead to using distinct privacy-preserving data mining 
techniques [17]. Thus, it is desirable to have a flexible privacy-
preserving mechanism that can be customized in terms of 
different requirements to approach a balance between data 
privacy and the data utility. The work [18] proposed an 
authorization service based on the Usage Control (UCON) 
model as well as U-XACML (an extension of XACML for 
Usage Control) to regulate the usage of resources in Cloud IaaS 
services, which was integrated within OpenNebula 3 . The 
UCON model, was introduced alongside a formal data sharing 
control mechanism termed Data Sharing Agreement (DSA) 
[19]. A DSA is a human readable, yet machine-processable 
contract, regulating how organisations share data. The concept 
of DSA was first applied in the CoCo Cloud Project [20], while 
the C3ISP Framework has adapted it for use with CTI data. 
B. CTI Data Sharing for Collaborative Analysis 
STIX [21], a standard information-exchange language, has 
been proposed for the purpose of CTI data sharing. STIX 
provides a common mechanism for addressing structured cyber 
threat information across and among a full range of use cases 
improving consistency, efficiency, interoperability, and overall 
situational awareness. Additionally, STIX provides a unifying 
architecture that is able to tie together a diverse set of cyber 
threat information, e.g. US-CERT [22], CVE [23] and CWE 
[24]. In addition to STIX, there are some other ontologies that 
attempt to enable sharing of CTI, such as IODEF [25] and 
OpenIOC [26]. Burger et al. [27] proposed a taxonomy for 
classifying these CTI sharing technologies by using an agnostic 
framework, in order to identify gaps in existing technologies 
and explain their differences from a scientific point view.  
                                                          
3 https://opennebula.org/ 
CYBEX (Cybersecurity Information Exchange Framework) 
[28] describes how cybersecurity information is exchanged 
between cybersecurity entities on a global scale and how the 
exchange is assured. CYBEX does not depend on STIX but 
rather on IODEF for describing information. It aims to provide 
a service of structured information exchange about measurable 
security states of systems, together with incidents stemming 
from cyberattacks. Later, D. Tosh et al. [29] proposed an 
evolutionary game-theoretic framework for CTI sharing that 
can guide: (i) the organisation to independently decide whether 
to “participate in CYBEX and share” or not; (ii) the CYBEX 
framework to utilize the participation cost dynamically as 
incentive (to attract ﬁrms toward self-enforced sharing) and as 
a charge (to increase revenue). 
Furthermore, the notion of collaborative CTI data sharing 
and analysis is applied in the Collaborative Intrusion Detection 
Systems (CIDS), which are designed to analyse threat 
information from multiple networks simultaneously for the 
purpose of detecting the attacks at an early stage and before 
they have caused signification impact on the Internet. Taking 
advantages of the CIDS, a global view of the suspicious events 
on the monitored targets [30] [31] can be gained and the ratio 
of false alarms [32] can be reduced. Zhou et al. [33] surveyed 
the collaborative intrusion detection approaches in cope with 
the emergence of coordinated attacks. Such attacks (e.g. large-
scale scans, worm outbreaks and DDoS attacks) often occur in 
multiple networks simultaneously. The authors stress that the 
main research challenges are alert correlation algorithms and 
CIDS architectures that were categorised into centralised 
architecture, hybrid architecture and fully distributed 
architecture, which are similar to the deployment models of 
C3ISP infrastructure. For instance, two works [34][35] 
proposed using CIDS to detect DDoS attacks for Cloud 
Computing, whereby one region’s IDS can share its alert data 
with the other IDS systems. This helps to reduce computational 
cost for detecting the same attacks at other IDS systems and 
therefore improves detection rate in overall cloud environment. 
The difference is the paper [34] rides on the fully distributed 
architecture while the paper [35] uses the hybrid architecture. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper presents a means of privacy-preserving sharing 
of Cyber Threat Information (CTI). In particular, it proposes a 
flexible architecture of API Gateway that facilitates the 
retrieving, sharing and analysis of CTI data, which can be 
easily tailored to specific application domains. In this paper, we 
show how the C3ISP Gateway can be integrated to the C3ISP 
Framework, thus allowing end-users to fully take advantage of 
the C3ISP Framework collaborative analytics. The flexible 
architecture of the C3ISP Gateway enables different C3ISP 
pilots to share multiple common components, which reduces 
pilot development costs, and facilitates the ease of replacing or 
augmenting the Managed Security Service (MSS) data with 
other data sources. 
For future work, firstly, we would like to extend the use of 
the C3ISP Gateway to the other pilots, resulting in a unified 
joint C3ISP Gateway architecture. Secondly, we plan to 
conduct more performance-focused validation of the C3ISP 
Framework, especially for CTI data sharing and analysis 
workflows. Lastly, we plan to develop more advanced, 
privacy-aware, collaborative analytics for the SME pilot with 
the purpose of exploiting the potential of collaborative data 
sharing within C3ISP Framework.  
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